

**Report on How to Distribute the Funds Donated to The Christchurch  
Foundation on behalf of the Victims of the 15<sup>th</sup> March Mosque Shootings**

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' <i>The Christchurch Foundation Funds Distribution APPENDIX_Local</i> ' document consisting of the following: .....	
1. [REDACTED] .....	
2. Open Space Forum Notes .....	
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6. CF_Monthly Update August.....	
7. CF_Monthly Update September .....	
8. CF_Monthly Update October.....	

- 9. CF\_Monthly Update November .....
- 'The Christchurch Foundation Funds Distribution APPENDIX\_International' document consisting of the following:.....
- 1. #Toronto Strong Final Report .....
  - 2. Christchurch Report National Zakat Foundation .....
  - 3. Kensington & Chelsea Foundation.....
  - 4. Responding to Disaster – London Bombing Relief Charitable Fund.....
  - 5. Distributing Funds in a Disaster\_London Emergency Trust .....
  - 6. UNODC Supporting Victims.....
  - 7. IVAR Learnings from Funder Reponses.....
  - 8. Independent Review\_We Love Manchester Emergency Fund .....

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Background:**

1. I was tasked by The Christchurch Foundation to provide recommendations on how best to distribute the funds donated on behalf of the victims of the 15<sup>th</sup> March Mosque shootings.
2. In total, \$11m was gifted to the Christchurch Foundation. Of these funds, \$2m has been passed on, leaving approximately \$9m to be distributed.
3. Of the \$9m, \$1.5m was tagged towards an Education Fund, \$1m was allocated to the Abrahamic Fund and \$0.5m was for a Medical Support fund for the more severely injured. This left \$6m in the Our People, Our City fund which was for the victims directly.
4. The initial request was for me to chair an advisory board made up of members of the affected Mosques and other community groups. The clear preference of the community was for a more direct approach, and so the advisory board was abandoned, and I conducted meetings as and when required and with whomsoever requested one.
5. Engaging and listening to victims on an individual and family basis resulted in a more open and detailed conversation and allowed for more significant feedback. 'The Listening Project' did provide an opportunity to hear back from victims and the wider community on a broad range of issues and not just how they felt about the attacks or their feedback on funds distributions.
6. It became clear through this process that the community was still in the early stages of post-incident trauma, had barely been able to gather their thoughts and was still struggling to get their basic personal and family affairs into some kind of order. There were obvious strains in financial situations, not just of the directly affected victims but their wider families and whanau. The financial impacts of time off work, loss of jobs and income, family obligations, visa and housing situations were still manifesting and there was little capacity to process and deal with this.

7. The ongoing court case and intermittent pre-trial hearings also added to the victim's anguish, not allowing them to focus on recovery and healing. As such, my recommendations do focus on the individual victims with an understanding that government needs to be providing ongoing support in the social, health, employment and community area.
8. In summary, this community continues to need strong support in many areas and, with the trial to come next year, there will be ongoing challenges in any substantial recovery without a considered strategy to support the community through 2020 and beyond.

### **Terms of Reference:**

9. The Terms of Reference were established to provide both certainty and direction to the community.
10. One of the challenges for a project like this was facing an extremely vulnerable community that had an inevitable sense of dissatisfaction at how previous funds had been distributed; they were not able to feedback their views on a range of issues.
11. Creating certainty and setting expectations early on was important, though even this approach did not guarantee a structured engagement.
12. The terms of reference were as follows:
  - *Make recommendations as to the best distribution of the funds to address the identified needs of the victims, and the wider communities.*
  - *Ensure that the longer-term needs (with an emphasis on education and training) of the children of those who were killed or severely injured (with lifelong impact), are met.*
  - *Ensure that any distribution covers costs not already covered by The Crown.*
  - *That the Muslim communities' views are acknowledged and factored into any recommendations.*

13. I have used these terms of reference as my guide for this project, and it is important that my recommendations are viewed through this lens.

### **The Listening Project:**

14. I attended my first community meeting with the Christchurch Muslim Liaison Group (CMLG) on July 25th, followed by my first direct meeting with a group of victims on July 30th. In total, I have completed 166 meetings, of which 139 were face-to-face with individuals or groups, and 27 over the phone. Numerous emails and texts were also used as methods of communication and feedback.
15. These direct engagements have been with bereaved families, bullet injured, witnesses, family and friends of the victims, Muslim community groups, community advocates, government agencies, expert advisors, politicians, the media and the wider community.
16. I have also accessed reports on funds distribution approaches after the Grenfell Fire, and the London, Toronto and Manchester terror attacks, and looked at the responses to the Oslo and the 9/11 attacks.<sup>1</sup>
17. I have tried to listen with an open mind remaining alert to the particular views of different people and groups and listening closely to those who spoke timidly. The advantage of this iterative approach has been the opportunity to have an ongoing conversation with the community. The drawback was the prevalence of rumours and misinformation, especially as there are groups on social media constantly talking to each other about what they heard.
18. With that in mind, I have produced monthly updates on progress, with feedback and timelines, in order to keep the community informed. It has by no means been perfect, as not everyone receives it or reads it, but it is a helpful guide to the direction of the feedback. The last update was sent out in early November.

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<sup>1</sup> See reports on Grenfell Fire, Manchester Arena, London Bombings, Toronto Attack

## Summary of Recommendations:

19. That the next of kin of the Shaheed (deceased) should receive \$70,000 each.
20. Acknowledging the specific challenges for widows, further support payments should be made to widow/ers and their children aged below 18 from a Widows and Children Fund [REDACTED], and not made public.
21. That the bullet injured should receive \$25,000 each.
22. In recognition of major lifelong injury and life impact, I recommend that those with severe injuries should receive further support from the Medical Support Fund. These payments will be specific to the individual, [REDACTED] and not made public.
23. A Hardship Fund of \$0.5m should be established to support the families of those victims who were present at the mosques and still experiencing financial hardship due to the attack. The payment will be \$5,000 per family and subject to criteria (to be confirmed).
24. In total, this brings total payouts to victims to \$7m.
25. There is a further \$1.5m that should be allocated towards an Education Fund for children of the bereaved and severely injured. This number is close to 75 children. The exact criteria and final numbers are to be confirmed.
26. I am recommending that the Community Support Fund receive \$0.5m.
27. This takes the total funds distribution to \$9m.

## COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

### Scope and Approach of the Listening Project:

28. It was clear early on that one-to-one engagement was both crucial and desired by the community. I allowed myself to be guided by their needs as to who to meet, where to meet and when to meet.
29. When Victim Support finalized their distributions, the focus turned to The Christchurch Foundation, not just for what they might do with the funds, but as a place for the community to feedback frustrations about a range of issues they felt had not been addressed. With multiple agencies engaging with each family, it was often confusing and exhausting for the victims.
30. I made myself available whenever I had free time and noted all meetings in a spreadsheet shared with The Christchurch Foundation team. Meetings were mainly held in individuals' homes, and local libraries and other community spaces where convenient. Family members were usually present, as well as support workers and community advocates.
31. Group meetings were also held as requested. I reached out to experts for advice on a range of different issues, in particular the ethics of funds distribution<sup>2</sup>. I engaged regularly with government agencies, specifically MSD, as lead case managers, but also the Police, ACC, Immigration NZ and OEC. All agencies were very cooperative and keen to help.
32. In total, I held 166 meetings, of which 139 were face-to-face with individuals or groups, and 27 over the phone. Numerous emails and texts were also used as methods of communication and feedback.
33. Monthly updates were provided to give a sense of progress and direction. This allowed for repeated conversations and a more iterative feedback process. After initial conversations, I produced a draft funds

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<sup>2</sup> [REDACTED]



framework, to enable a more focused debate on where funds could or should be allocated.<sup>3</sup>

34. This was helpful in understanding community priorities and also as a discussion document for other parties, specifically government, as it helped define potential areas of overlap more clearly. It also allowed for ideas to be raised and discussed, and for further clarity over what funds were already tagged or allocated. The initial feedback from the first six weeks was summarized in a presentation to a group of widows on 15<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>4</sup>
35. This provided a helpful summary midway through the project, and allowed for further discussions, as well as a clearer understanding of some of the issues facing the victims and wider community. The Listening Project was earmarked to conclude at the end of October, in order to meet deadlines for reporting to the board.
36. Whilst individual meetings were continuing to be held, the Listening Project concluded on November 1<sup>st</sup>, with a report to the board to be provided for consideration at a special board meeting on November 20<sup>th</sup>.

### **Community Feedback:**

37. The initial feedback was a clear desire for an independent process. The lack of trust in the current structures and formal representation felt by the victims was palpable. This remains an ongoing challenge for the community.
38. There was still a sense of unhappiness about the Victim Support approach and how other representative groups had acted on the victim's behalf, notwithstanding their efforts to be supportive. It was clear that the directly impacted victims (bereaved and bullet injured) were very keen to have their individual voices heard.
39. There was a wide range of views as to what should happen; the community appeared to be both fractured and precarious in nature;

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<sup>3</sup> See 'Draft Funds Framework'

<sup>4</sup> See 'The Listening Project'

there was a lack of trusted leadership and there were generational differences and divisions between differently impacted groups.

40. The precarious nature of the community (primarily related to employment and immigration status) only added to their already vulnerable state. There was considerable financial stress in the community due to the widespread impacts of the attacks, and this is ongoing.
41. For many victims, particularly the widows, this was their first chance to really talk and make their views heard. It was also an opportunity to raise many challenging issues, particularly immigration status, income challenges, and family and housing requirements.
42. It was also clear the positive nature of the initial government response and support was wearing off and many challenges were just starting to manifest. With the first anniversary of the attack and the trial next year, there will be ongoing stressors for the community. There is no doubt that ongoing and more focused support for the victims is needed.
43. The challenges due to more practical issues, such as visa status, work and income, family demands and responsibilities were also causing strains within the community and a sense of frustration was starting to build. The ongoing trial process was also causing added stress. Questions about the trial, and the issue of justice for the victims were often raised in meetings.
44. It was also noticeable that there was an existing lack of cohesion in the community and the attacks had magnified that. Whilst there were requests for broader community support and capability, safe and culturally appropriate meeting spaces, the needs of the victims were still of paramount importance.
45. The wider community was still exhibiting signs of ongoing trauma and stress, which is not a surprise, but this was impacting all aspects of their lives. Many small business owners were struggling to re-open and many employees were finding it hard to re-engage with their work.

46. Many of those present at the mosques, both inside and outside, were still struggling, but felt somewhat ignored and not regarded as victims. Whilst many of them had received payments from Victim Support, some had not, and this was causing further stress. Defining victims is always a fraught process but there is no doubt that the reverberations of the attacks have impacted the wider community, even those not anywhere near the mosques at the time of the attacks.<sup>5</sup>
47. Looking ahead, there was hope for more solidarity within the community and new leadership. There was acknowledgement that new capability needed to be developed, new voices to emerge and for more collaboration to happen between the different, established community groups. The younger generation was keen to take more responsibility and to work more proactively with each other for the benefit of the wider community.
48. The needs of the community were difficult to articulate and there was a distinct need for victim advocacy. Christchurch Resettlement Service provided excellent support for the families and was able to really understand the challenges faced by individual families. Getting to grips with a complex range of needs and navigating support agencies was difficult, with a noticeable lack of cultural competency in the frontline government response.
49. They needed quick decisions on visas, particularly for family members and support. There needed to be a broader, more whanau-based understanding of the family unit and how best victims could be supported, particularly the widows. This more collective approach also needed to be applied to mental health and trauma support. Individual phone counseling was not considered useful and more thought needed to be given to culturally appropriate therapy and support.
50. There was a desire for support for community events, to bring people together and provide some safe places for children to mingle and play. Rebuilding a sense of community was considered to be important but there was acknowledgement that this would take time and small steps were better than grandiose projects.

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<sup>5</sup> See 'National Zakat Foundation Report'

51. Training and education requirements were also raised. There was a strong desire for pathways to be made clear and long-term plans for independence, education and employment to be supported. There is an opportunity here for improving diversity and inclusion in our workplaces by recruiting and training those from our diverse communities.
52. Ideas for community funding included youth focused spaces, a new mosque, school, community owned medical center, community-based employment options and a housing fund. These ideas matched the outcomes of the Open Space Forum at the end of August.<sup>6</sup>
53. Through this process, there were many approaches to the Foundation for help from the community. There was a strong sense that no one was advocating for the victims themselves, and no confidence in the existing Muslim organizations to act on their behalf. The Foundation was seen as a last resort for help and support and filled a clear gap in the recovery framework.
54. Because of this, the Foundation set up two small cash funds: one to provide cash grants to those in hardship, who could not be helped by MSD, and a community grant fund to support actions and events in the community. To date eight cash grants and four community grants have been made, totaling just under \$35,000. The Countdown and Z Energy vouchers have also been very helpful, and we have given out just over \$50,000 worth.
55. There was also a sense of fatigue from having to deal with multiple agencies and requests for information from all manner of organisations. Data sharing between agencies was limited and this made enquiries for information difficult to manage and caused difficulties for victims who simply did not have a good understanding of the government agency framework.

### **Main Issues:**

56. This was a terrorist attack, a mass slaughter of innocent people in a place of worship, and a clear attempt to target a specific community,

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<sup>6</sup> See 'Open Space Forum' notes.

with the sole purpose of killing as many of them as possible. It is important to always remember that when considering the more mundane aspects of recovery.

57. There are still significant challenges and widespread trauma in the community. Many of the most affected victims (bereaved and severely injured) are just coming to terms with their losses, the attack on their community and the reality of their future lives.
58. The community is experiencing financial challenges from the impacts of business closures, family responsibilities, uncertain immigration status, mental health issues and an underlying precariousness. For many, there is a sense of uncertainty about the future and no clear path to recovery.
59. As far as the distribution of funds was concerned, the priority needs were still with the bereaved families, specifically the widows. Many were vulnerable, with young children, in some cases newborns, and had language challenges also. Those with major and severe injuries were also experiencing difficulties, with further surgeries to come and long recovery pathways ahead.
60. Immigration status for family support members and even widows themselves were causing uncertainty and stress, and an inability to plan ahead. There was a sense that the government was not fully supportive of this help and comments in the media from certain government politicians was causing distress.
61. The Bullet Injured group was recovering at different rates depending on the severity of their injury. For most of them, getting back to some kind of work was a challenge. For the more severely injured, ongoing surgery was still occurring and there were a small number of permanent injuries who would need further specialized support.
62. There was recognition that the term 'victims' applied to those present and around the mosque during and after the shootings. Many of them were still suffering the impact of ongoing trauma and struggling to find

their place in the recovery conversation.<sup>7</sup> Returning to work, and even leaving the home was a challenge. Fear of strangers was a constant refrain and worry.

63. There was strong support for the Education Fund and many questions as to who would qualify. There is hope that more funds will be gifted over time to allow wider access and more opportunities for this community.
64. There was support for funding for Community projects, but, as with mental health and wellbeing, this was seen as something that Local and central Government should also be supporting, as well as other community funding groups and organizations. There was also a sense that the community was not yet in a position to make well-considered long-term decisions. That is not unusual in a post-trauma situation.
65. There was also little agreement on what should be funded, other than youth development, events and capacity building support. This is likely to be a conversation that the community needs to revisit once victims reach some stability in their lives.
66. There were challenges within the wider community who were not physically present at the mosques. Family members, friends, colleagues and neighbors all experienced impacts from the attacks. This caused unseen financial consequences and emotional stress.
67. The lack of clear and accepted leadership in the community was a further negative. Trust in the formal institutions was and remains low, and this continues to contribute to a fractured community.
68. Even with all the challenges and differing opinions over distributions, there was a strong sense of gratitude to the public and other donor organizations for their incredible support.
69. The lack of specific victim advocacy and representation came through strongly. There were numerous government agencies playing a very supportive role, but not many people actually advocating just for the

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<sup>7</sup> [REDACTED]

victims. The Courts and CDHB have addressed this with culturally supportive working groups but the victims have many other practical needs that they have needed help with.

### **Basis for the Funds Distribution Recommendations:**

70. The recommendations that I have made reflect the many conversations I had over this three-month period. It was an immersive experience, fraught with emotion, pain and frustration. It was an iterative process, meeting the same people and groups more than once, and examining the same issue from different angles, whilst testing assumptions and beliefs.
71. I believe this approach, whilst hard going at times, has allowed for all issues to be raised, discussed and debated. The process of distribution of gifted funds post-tragedy is always open to challenge and this will be no different.
72. The recommendations stick with the general categorization of next of kin, bullet injured and those witnesses still experiencing financial hardship. This does not ignore the fact that the whole community is a victim, and that experiences of the attacks will vary for many years to come.
73. Each recommendation can be challenged on its own, but as a whole and within the boundaries of available funds, I believe they meet the requirements of both the terms of reference, the needs of the victims and the feedback from the community.
74. I have also been fortunate enough to have reports from both the Grenfell Fire and Toronto attacks, as well as broader research on other events. They all follow a similar path of trying to identify who the victims are and then how to categorize them according to some kind of impact. This often seems unfair to the wider victim group, yet it is how the life and health insurance systems work on a daily basis.
75. Gifted funds do have a different perspective and can be distributed in a myriad of ways. However, the prime goal is how best to help the victims, acknowledging that they will be impacted in different ways. The three main groups tend to be the bereaved, the injured and the

traumatized. The latter group is usually the most difficult to support, as their injuries are not always visible and not easy to define or diagnose.

76. It should be noted here that the distribution of funds by Victim Support had left lingering anger and frustration in some parts of the community, and that created a problematic landscape for The Christchurch Foundation to enter. I make further comments on that process in my broader recommendations below.
77. Whilst these funds will help and allow victims to start planning ahead, there will still be challenges for many of the victims and the wider community, with immigration, employment and income likely to be ongoing issues. Housing and on-going health support will also be a pressing concern.
78. It is important to note that these funds are gifted from the community, by both individual and organizational donors. They do not represent compensation, reparation or restitution. They represent love, support and succor.
79. The wishes of the donors, both stated and implied, are also reflected in the final recommendations. This is important to recognize as part of the overall considerations.
80. Privacy is another issue that needed consideration. Victim Support set expectations by making each payment amount and category public. This allows for a transparent view for donors and the general public but does and did create tensions within different recipient groups.
81. Given those pressures, there was always going to be heavy scrutiny over The Christchurch Foundation distribution, both as to whether it would be regarded as fair and also whether it would potentially 'make up' for any perceived misallocation by Victim Support.
82. For that reason, the base payments to each person in each category has been made public, but the further targeted payments to the widows and children, and those with major injuries has been kept



private. The balance between privacy and transparency is a delicate one.<sup>8</sup>

83. Widows with young children are a very vulnerable group. Along with their personal grief, they have many daily pressures to manage and new circumstances to adjust to. Along with extra support for them, I am recommending appropriate financial and legal advice to help in them building a safe and stable foundation for the next stage of their and their children's lives.
84. Funds have already been allocated for the severely injured group through the Medical Support Fund, and this support will be available for those categorized by ACC as having long-term impairment and ongoing challenges.
85. The Hardship Fund has been the hardest one to construct. It is not meant to be a repeat of the payment to all those present at the mosques but is a reflection that there are some families that are still struggling, and some families who were present at the mosque who did not receive any payments at all.
86. This has been a very challenging issue. Where does one draw the line? The attacks were not confined to the inside of the mosques but spilled out onto the grounds and the pavements and roads outside. Witnesses who viewed the shooter outside the grounds of the mosques, or had a weapon pointed at them, or saw someone being shot, were not treated as victims for the purposes of financial support.
87. The reports provided from both the Grenfell Fire and Toronto Attack responses reinforce these challenges of defining the 'victim' and the requirement to be flexible on the understanding of how people are impacted. Differently impacted groups also feel trauma in different ways, and the distribution of gifted funds sadly can have the unwanted consequence of causing further trauma.
88. The Ethics of Funds Distribution is a little-known area of study, but I was fortunate enough to meet [REDACTED] who produced a detailed report on this topic. We had several conversations about the

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<sup>8</sup> See 'Toronto Strong Final Report' and 'National Zakat Foundation' report

complexity of this issue and I am grateful for her input and the report she produced.<sup>9</sup>

89. Zakat, or charity, is an important Islamic principle and this fund is targeted at that broader group of victims still in need and suffering financial hardship. Many victims, listed official and not, have presented to the Foundation with a need for help, and it is appropriate to do so.
90. The Education Fund has already been tagged for children of the bereaved and severely injured to be used for tertiary education and training. As with all funds, there has been a lot of interest and enquiry as to the criteria for this fund. The focus on this fund is for Children who were Under 18 at the time of the attack. The fund needs to be meaningful, so there is a trade-off between the amount available per child, and the number of children it can support.
91. In a case like this, it's important for the donors to be consulted, as the funds have been specifically tagged. A lot of work has been done on finding out exactly how many children there are in this group and how far the funds will stretch. I have also been mindful that this is a fund that could receive further funds over time, so the criteria needs to be flexible enough to allow for that. Initial work suggests that 75 children could qualify, which would allow support of \$20,000 per child. This would cover the average costs of a 3-year degree.
92. The Community Support Fund is smaller than I would have first estimated. Primarily this is because the needs of the victims are still the priority. It is also clear that the community is not ready yet to make any long lasting decisions about broader needs. Whilst general feedback confirms the results of the Open Space Forum, there is still little agreement over what the community needs. There is also still confusion over other donation funds and promises made for various projects. It is still early days in this recovery, and longer-term community projects need plenty of consideration and thought.
93. This suggests that the community focus should be on shorter-term support and immediate impact, such as events, youth development,

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building community capability and establishing trust and collaboration within the various community organizations and networks. Whilst this occurs, conversation can take place on the longer-term needs, and time can be taken to build a platform for multi-funder approaches, noting other foundations and organizations also have funds set aside for this purpose.

94. As such, there was a strong feeling that both central and local government, as well as other community funding organizations, should be the prime supporters in this space. Building stronger communities and supporting social cohesion is a prime role of local government. That said, there was still acknowledgement that some of the donated funds should be going into this area, as the community as a whole had been attacked and it needed careful and considered support to recover, both in the short, medium and long-term.
95. It should be noted that the funds distribution processes have been highly public and transparent. From the donor perspective that is a good thing, as donors need to be certain that their donated funds are going to the right places. At the same time, the privacy of victims is also important, as is the recognition that introducing large sums of money into a vulnerable community creates its own challenges and this has required consideration.
96. It is intended that cash payments will be made as soon as possible. It is also recommended that financial and budgeting advice should be available to the community, in order to help them make the best decisions for themselves, noting there is no restriction on how those donated funds should be used.
97. The remaining funds (Education Support, Widows and Children Support, Medical Support and Community Support) will be disbursed according to their specific criteria. The Christchurch Foundation may wish to promote these funds as opportunities for further donations.
98. Although an uncomfortable topic, it is important to address the issue of ratios within payouts. The insurance industry (and our own ACC) is well practiced in paying out for adverse events. As far as terror attacks and other specific trauma events, such as the Grenfell Fire, there is a

general rule of thumb of how one treats a bereaved family against someone who may be wounded, and whether witnesses are included.

99. From what I could research within the time available<sup>10</sup>, I found that a ratio of 2.5-2.8:1 was used as a ratio between bereaved and wounded. Severely wounded were treated differently and information was not readily accessible on specific ratios, but special treatment was given to that category. In some cases, witnesses received a small payout and in other cases they did not. PTSD was noted as being difficult to diagnose and treat, and an issue that was best managed through the appropriate mental health service.

**FUNDS FOR DISTRIBUTION**

<p><b>Victim's Fund</b> \$TBC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>› Cash support for directly impacted victims of the attacks</li><li>› Funds primarily for the bereaved and bullet injured but also small fund to support those still in financial hardship</li></ul> 	<p><b>Education Fund</b> \$TBC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>› Support for higher education and post-school training costs</li><li>› For children of bereaved families and severely injured</li></ul> 	<p><b>Community Support Fund</b> \$TBC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>› To help build community capacity and engagement</li><li>› Support youth development</li><li>› Support long-term community recovery and wellbeing</li></ul> 
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Victims Fund



Education Support Fund



Community Support Fund



<sup>10</sup> See reports on Grenfell Fire, Manchester Arena, London Bombings, Toronto Attack



## Details of the Funds:

100. Shaheed Fund: This fund will make a single payment to the next of kin of the Shaheed (51 in total).
101. Widows and Children Fund: This is a fund to support the vulnerable widows and their dependent children (U18). Payments will be made to each widow and on behalf of each child [REDACTED].
102. Bullet Injured Fund: This fund will make a single payment to all the bullet injured (40 in total).
103. Medical Support Fund for the Severely Injured: This is a fund to support the bullet injured who have ongoing injury challenges and, in some cases, permanent loss of function. [REDACTED].
104. Hardship Fund: This fund is for those affected by ongoing financial hardship due to the mosque attacks. The payment per family will be \$5,000 (the fund allows for a maximum of 100 families). The criteria will be based on being present at the mosque and appropriate proof of hardship (e.g. referral from MSD).
105. Education Fund: This fund is to support post-school education and training for children of the Shaheed and severely injured. The criteria still needs to be confirmed but would include the siblings (U18) of deceased children. The numbers are still being clarified but likely to be around 75, suggesting an allowance of \$20,000 per child.
106. Community Support Fund: This fund is directed towards building community capability, supporting youth development and long-term community recovery and wellbeing. No decision has been made on how this fund will work, as there are multiple options (in-house, partnered or outsourced).

## Further Comments for the Board:

107. This has been an exhausting process. The anxiety and stress in the community remains at high levels, as much as they put a brave face on in public. In private conversations, there are still many concerns and many questions.
108. There is still much to do to properly support this community, and they will need further help over the next 12-15 months, particularly noting the possible negative impact of the trial next year. One always has to view this response through a magnified and correctly calibrated lens: namely the reality of a terror attack on a specific community and a targeted mass slaughter of innocent people in a place of worship.
109. Cultural competency and a lack of diversity have been lacking in the frontline response, and this has led to problems in understanding and communication. This lack of understanding only manifests over time and these communication challenges should not be underestimated, particularly in such a vulnerable community.
110. As mentioned already, this is a vulnerable, precarious and fractured community. It will need to know it has ongoing, appropriate and equitable support, especially over the next year.<sup>11</sup> The lack of trust in its formal institutions (FIANZ and MAC) and its small collection of community groups, is both a major concern and also reflective of a very diverse community, with multiple ethnicities and cultures represented.
111. Nevertheless, this is an opportunity, as part of the broader response and recovery, to develop great trust. It is likely to fall to the new and younger generations to do this. In my observation, the capability is there but it needs to be supported to flourish. Traditional political and power structures may need to reform and respond to this and that will require some change in both attitude and behaviour. That will not be easy, but it must be addressed.

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<sup>11</sup> See <https://www.cdhb.health.nz/wp-content/uploads/5fe3e197-rapid-literature-review-cdhb-response-christchurch-mosque-attacks-2019.pdf>

112. Issues around integration and assimilation have come to the fore, as have more unpleasant problems of racism, discrimination and prejudice. However challenging, these issues will need to be discussed openly and considerately, as part of the long-term recovery.
113. The Listening Project became a space for all manner of issues to be raised, often not to do with the distribution of funds but general problems within the community. The distribution of grocery (Countdown) and petrol (Z Energy) vouchers was very welcome by the community. It also acted as a self-selection system for those in need to come forward and it provided a way into the community.
114. It also revealed gaps in the support system and allowed a safe place for people to raise concerns. As such, my role broadened from simply hearing feedback on the needs of the community and the distribution of funds, to help with immigration, housing, income, jobs, family disputes and dealing with government agencies.
115. Two funds were set up to provide short-term cash support, one for income and one for community grants. The income fund was for those victims who, for whatever reason, could not get appropriate support for welfare agencies and needed help. The community grants fund was for support for events and organizations to have immediate impact. Turn around time for these approvals were normally 24 hours.
116. The Foundation became a place of last resort for the community, and also government support agencies. This placed a huge amount of pressure and demand on what is a tiny team of people. Our approach was to be very responsive and fill what was a clear gap in the support framework. It should be noted that The Foundation was not resourced for this type of response and this created a great deal of pressure for all those involved to keep up with the constant demands.
117. However, this broader interaction with the community, which was not anticipated at the time I was asked to take on this role, has allowed for major insights as the state of the community and the appropriateness of the government response. I have summed up that feedback in the next section.



## RESPONSE FEEDBACK

### The Government Response:

118. Victim Support is the first port of call in any incident where there is a victim. They responded to the attacks promptly, and many Victim Support workers are still connected to their families and have provided ongoing care and support though a very challenging time.
119. They also set up a crowdfunding page on Givealittle<sup>12</sup>, which raised almost \$11m. There were many other fundraising pages set up and large numbers of donations flowed in from all around the world<sup>13</sup>. What this meant was that Victim Support ended up with a dual role, one, which was to look after the victims, in itself a very challenging job, and also to be responsible for distributing the donated funds.
120. With The Christchurch Foundation also raising funds, this did cause some confusion, although a clear demarcation was made between distribution processes and timelines. The community expressed confusion at some aspects of the fundraising process and of the many promises for support that were made post-event. It would be useful to know exactly how much was raised in total through the various funds and what is planned for any outstanding amounts but that is beyond the scope of this project.
121. Once Victim Support had completed their final distributions, the focus turned to The Christchurch Foundation and what they would do. There was immediate pressure to somehow make up for or rectify any unhappiness with the Victim Support distribution. This put the Foundation in a difficult position of having to be the 'lender of last resort' but it was able to take a more flexible approach.
122. Alongside Victim Support, multiple other agencies were playing key roles in the support space. MSD were designated as the lead agency with case managers attached to each victim. ACC played a major role in

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<sup>12</sup> See <https://givealittle.co.nz/cause/christchurch-shooting-victims-fund>

<sup>13</sup> See [https://www.launchgood.com/campaign/support\\_for\\_the\\_families\\_victims\\_of\\_the\\_new\\_zealand\\_mosque\\_shootings#!/](https://www.launchgood.com/campaign/support_for_the_families_victims_of_the_new_zealand_mosque_shootings#!/)

supporting the injured, specifically the gunshot wounded. WINZ also played a role in income support. Some of the wounded were accessing WINZ payments, as their ACC entitlement was too low due to their work situation.

123. Immigration NZ was in the frontline as well in terms of processing a myriad of requests for residency, both from the bereaved families, bullet injured and wider community. This has been a very challenging issue for the victims and caused much stress.
124. The Office of Ethnic Communities was expanded in Christchurch to aid interaction with the Muslim community and their presence has become more impactful. The Police and the Courts provided support to the victims with Family Liaison Officers and Court Victim advisors. The Ministry of Justice has also provided further support for the victims through a cultural advisory group.
125. Mental health support was provided through the CDHB which included Muslim support workers from Auckland based Kahui Tu Kaha.<sup>14</sup> This mental health support has shifted to local providers through a group of new community support workers at Pura Pura Whetu, funded by the CDHB.<sup>15</sup> Managing ongoing trauma and PTSD amongst the wider victims group will be a challenge and will need a considered and well-communicated approach.
126. This multi-agency response provided support across many areas. It meant many families had interactions with a number of different support workers and this did cause some confusion and challenges in simply keeping up to date with different visitors and whom they represented. Added into this mix were community response groups and advocates who acted on behalf of certain families but in an ad hoc manner that was difficult to track.

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<sup>14</sup> See <https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/supporting-people-affected-christchurch-mosque-attacks-jul19.docx>

<sup>15</sup> See <https://www.pw.maori.nz/2019/10/10/muslim-community-support-at-purapura-whetu/>

127. Whilst MSD was designated as the lead case manager, for many families their main interaction was with other agencies such as ACC, Victim Support or ImmigrationNZ. There was a noticeable lack of cultural competency in the frontline response and language, culture and communication challenges were prevalent. Also of note was the issue of understanding. Translation and interpretation helps with the words but actually understanding and comprehending what the words mean is often a further challenge.<sup>16</sup>
128. Data and information sharing was a major challenge. The families were somewhat exhausted by constant requests for waiver forms to allow sharing of information. The Foundation spent a lot of time trying to get very basic information, yet all the focus and demands from the community were directed to them.
129. Overall, all the agencies were very helpful and doing their best to support the victims and wider community within the specific constraints of their departmental mandates.

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<sup>16</sup> See <https://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/read-the-journal/all-issues/2010-2019/2019/vol-132-no-1504-25-october-2019/8028>

## **KEY INSIGHTS**

### **Cultural Competency:**

130. Culturally competent workers should have been on the frontline across all agencies. This is a highly vulnerable community, who are uncertain of their place in New Zealand. This has been an ongoing refrain from the community for many years.
131. There should have been relevant language speakers available, not just in ad hoc interpreting roles, but as part of the wider response, with culturally competent victim advisors appointed to work on behalf of the victims, rather than represent a government agency.
132. There should have been a recognition that a specific, community tailored response was required, particularly noting the collective approach to decision-making and family requirements, and extreme vulnerability of this community.
133. There is an opportunity now for government to seriously promote diversity and inclusion by training and recruiting from this community. There is a lot of visible talent and energy and it is important to enable that to flourish. This could include targeted and intensive language training for talented refugees.

### **Victim Advocacy:**

134. Victims require advocates who represent their interests and act on their behalf. There has been a serious gap there, filled in by ad hoc advocate groups that sprung up after the attacks but found it hard to maintain a position.
135. Given the structure of government agencies, it is hard to see how any one agency could properly act as a lead agency, unless they had complete flexibility to act across agencies, access any data and information and be the single port of all for any issue.
136. Victims' needs and issues are so varied that case managers do need to have a multi-disciplinary approach and be able to advise and deal with

multiple agencies. Refugee Resettlement Services is experienced in this area and has been a good support for the affected families.

137. Case managers should have appropriate cultural competency. This is a vulnerable community, with multiple ethnicities, with many refugees and recent migrants. Understanding the victim's daily lives and cultural framework is a must before attempting any kind of serious long-term support response.
138. This suggests a more bespoke approach, where appropriate persons (victim advocates) are brought in to be the interface between victims and government agencies and be recognized as part of the official response structure.

### **Financial Support for the Victims:**

139. Large sums of donated funds create many issues for vulnerable communities. Appropriate financial and legal advice should be provided to help victims manage these funds. Of particular note are the many young widows with young children. They are highly vulnerable and will need significant support to navigate the next few years, which will be challenging on many levels.
140. Incomes post-attack were severely affected and yet victims were treated very much in a BAU framework, which had a negative effect on many. Income support has been withdrawn if families departed New Zealand for more than 28 days, small business owners have suffered but have not been provided with any specific support and visiting family support members have been charged full cost for any medical events. There are many consequences and impacts which have not been acknowledged or fairly treated.
141. Victims were offered income support based on immigration status and income at the time of the attack, and this caused major stress. As with the appropriate case management approach above, their needs to be a focus on creating a supportive financial platform for the victims to recover.
142. A bespoke approach to income support, such as a minimum weekly income for 12-24 months for the victims, should be considered.

Removing income stress is a significant part of the recovery process, when there are so many impacts to peoples' lives.

### **Funds Distribution:**

143. In a post-disaster event, there should be a single source for funds distribution, noting donations are often given in multiple ways and to a myriad of organisations and fund-raising pages.
144. Being both the direct support for the victim and the decision maker on and distributor of collected funds potentially compromised Victim Support's role and complicated the ability to have a consistent response.
145. Local organisations are usually best placed to perform this role, and some further thought should be given to how to handle donated funds distribution post-disaster.
146. Given the large sums donated to various organisations, and many questions from the community about where the funds had gone, it would be a useful exercise to commission an independent report on this, as well clarifying some of the promised community support, which may or may not have eventuated.

### **Data Sharing:**

147. Whilst privacy is an important issue, a multi-agency data sharing system should have been implemented.
148. Accurate information is critical when dealing with such a vulnerable community. In an event such as a terror attack, appropriate and bespoke processes should be created.
149. A single case file on each victim and their family connections should have been created and be accessed by any relevant agency or approved organisation, such as The Christchurch Foundation, with approval from the Privacy Commissioner.

### **Mental Health, Wellbeing and Trauma:**

150. Many victims, outside the bereaved and bullet injured have reported the effects of ongoing trauma. This is recognized as being a challenging issue to treat, but a real long-term risk in the wider community.
151. Some victims may feel aggrieved at neither being recognised as a victim or receiving payouts from donated funds. In this case, Victim Support did make payouts to those present at the Mosques (\$17,000 per person) but some still feel that they should be treated equally with other victims.
152. The literature and responses from previous events tend to support a longer-term health service approach to trauma and PTSD but this needs to be culturally competent, well signaled and communicated. The Manchester Resilience Hub, which was set up as a response to the 2107 Manchester Arena attack, is a useful example.<sup>17</sup>
153. Social cohesion will also be critical to the long-term recovery of victim and community wellbeing. Recent reports show that dislocated, fractured and unwell communities are at high risk for negative outcomes.<sup>18</sup> Promoting a strong resilience and wellbeing focused community framework would be an appropriate response.

### **Recommendations:**

154. In an event such as a mass murder and terrorist attack, there should be a bespoke response, taking into account the affected community, their needs and their vulnerabilities.
155. A multi-disciplinary team of culturally competent support workers should be appointed to manage and communicate the victims' needs. Resources for ongoing financial and legal advice for victims should be provided to help support them through the next 24 months.
156. There should be a single and local source of funds distribution, in this case, the Christchurch Foundation, with added resource for the task,

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<sup>17</sup> See <https://www.penninecare.nhs.uk/mcrhub>

<sup>18</sup> See <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/countering-violent-extremism>


and the ability to manage long-term donations and endowments. An audit of all donated funds would also be useful.

157. Appropriate financial support for the victims should be flexible, tailored to their complex needs, run for at least 24 months, and allow for the best possible recovery path. The current income support approach should be reviewed.
158. Data sharing amongst agencies and qualified organisations, with approval from the Privacy Commissioner, should be tailored to the complex requirements of the community.
159. A formal Mental Health and Trauma center should be set up to manage the long-term needs of this, and other communities.

### **APPENDIX DOCUMENTS available in Attachments**

All of the documents referred to in this paper are consolidated in two APPENDIX documents.

*'The Christchurch Foundation Funds Distribution APPENDIX\_Local'* document consisting of the following:

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2. Open Space Forum Notes
  3. The Listening Project
  4. CDHB Literature Review Wellbeing after Mass Shootings
  5. Draft Funds Framework
  6. CF\_Monthly Update August
  7. CF\_Monthly Update September
  8. CF\_Monthly Update October
  9. CF\_Monthly Update November

*'The Christchurch Foundation Funds Distribution APPENDIX\_International'* document consisting of the following:

1. #Toronto Strong Final Report
2. Christchurch Report National Zakat Foundation
3. Kensington & Chelsea Foundation
4. Responding to Disaster – London Bombing Relief Charitable Fund
5. Distributing Funds in a Disaster\_London Emergency Trust
6. UNODC Supporting Victims



7. IVAR Learnings from Funder Responses
8. Independent Review\_We Love Manchester Emergency Fund

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